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Executive Summary 
 
There is a continuous debate in the economics of education and in policy circles about 
the merits of early versus late tracking of students in secondary schools.  Many 
European countries have moved from a system of tracking students early to one where 
students stay in comprehensive schools until a fairly late age.  Britain moved from a 
system of extensive and early selection and tracking in secondary schools to one with 
comprehensive schools during the 1960s and 70s.  Before the reform, students would 
take an exam at age eleven, which determined whether they would attend an 
academically oriented grammar school or a lower level secondary school.  The reform 
proceeded at an uneven pace in different areas, so that both secondary school systems 
coexisted during the 1960s and 70s.  In principle, the British transition therefore 
provides an excellent laboratory for the study of the impact of a comprehensive versus 
a selective school system on student achievement.  Not surprisingly, a large body of 
research exists on the impact of the British reorganization. 
 
Previous studies analyzing this transition have typically used a value-added 
methodology: they compare outcomes for students passing through either type of 
school controlling for achievement levels of the student at the time of entering 
secondary education.  While this seems like a reasonable research design, we 
demonstrate that it is unlikely to successfully eliminate selection effects in who 
attends what type of school.  We use data from the National Child Development Study 
for students born in 1958, who attended secondary school during the early 1970s, in 
the middle of comprehensive reorganization.  We obtain results similar to the previous 
literature if we analyze age 16 test scores, controlling for student achievement at age 
11.   
 
However, we question whether these results can be interpreted at reflecting the causal 
effect of comprehensive schooling.  We obtain very similar results if we look at the 
effect of secondary school environment on achievement at age 11 and controlling for 
age 7 achievement.  Since children only enter secondary school at age 11, these 
effects are likely due to selection bias.  We show that accounting for measurement 
error, a careful choice of treatment and control areas, and using political control of the 
county as an instrument for early implementation of the comprehensive regime do not 
solve this problem.  This casts doubt on the results reported in the literature, and we 
conclude that in practice little has been learned from the British comprehensive school 
transition. 
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1. Introduction 
National school systems differ widely in the amount of ability tracking of students they 
provide in secondary school.  Some systems (e.g. the US) are based on comprehensive 
schools, where students of all abilities attend the same school, although there is typically 
some tracking within schools.  Other systems (e.g. Germany) channel students at an early age 
into different types of schools based on academic ability.  British schools moved from a 
system of extensive tracking to one with comprehensive schools in the 1960s and 70s.  The 
British experience is interesting, because it involved a major and well defined change in 
terms of the ability grouping of secondary school students.  Hence, it offers potentially very 
promising research designs in order to assess the impact of the secondary school regime on 
student achievement.  It is unsurprising that numerous studies in the education and economics 
of education literatures analyze the British experience. 
In the traditional British school system, students were tracked into either an academically 
selective grammar school at age 11, or they would attend a secondary modern school, which 
was academically less demanding.  Starting in the 1950s, there was dissatisfaction with 
selection at the local level, and some local authorities began to experiment with 
comprehensive schools.  In 1965, the central government asked the Local Education 
Authorities (LEAs) to draw up plans to switch to a comprehensive system.  The 
implementation proceeded slowly, with faster growing, more Labour leaning LEAs moving 
to comprehensive schools more quickly, while those without expanding numbers of students, 
and more Conservative leaning Authorities implemented the change more slowly.  In fact, 
there are still a number of LEAs to date which provide grammar schools as an option. 
Much of the research on comprehensive education in Britain uses the National Child 
Development Study (NCDS), a panel which tracks members of the 1958 birth cohort.  The 
sample members entered secondary school in 1969, at a time when some LEAs in Britain had 
started to provide comprehensive schools already, while others continued to offer the 
traditional selective schools.  Hence, the comparisons using the NCDS are essentially cross-
sectional.  While Kerckhoff et al. (1996) claim that comprehensive areas differ little from 
selective areas, we find that comprehensive areas are systematically poorer, and have students 
with lower previous achievement.  A raw comparison of students attending comprehensive 
and selective schools is therefore not possible.  Most previous studies rely on some form of a 
value added specification, where student performance at age 16 is a function of student 
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performance at age 11, the secondary school environment, and possibly other control 
variables.   
This seems an entirely reasonably research design, particularly since the NCDS offers a large 
set of controls on student ability and family background.  We demonstrate in this paper that 
this methodology is nevertheless unlikely to be completely successful in removing the 
selection bias between comprehensive and selective school students.  The NCDS provides 
test scores at ages 7, 11, and 16.  It is therefore possible to run an analogous specification for 
student performance at age 11 on student performance at age 7, and the secondary school 
environment.  Since students at age 11 have not started attending secondary school yet, the 
secondary school environment should have no influence on age 11 outcomes if the 
specification successfully removes the selection bias.  This exercise is therefore a falsification 
test for the value added specification. 
OLS value added specifications tend to lead to a small negative average effect of 
comprehensive schooling compared to selective schooling in our sample.  We demonstrate 
that effects of a similar size or larger are obtained when using age 11 test scores as outcomes.  
This suggests that the methodology is unable to remove the selection bias between students 
attending different schools.  A more interesting finding of the previous literature (particularly 
Kerkhoff et al., 1996) may be that comprehensive schools tend to be equalizing, in that they 
lower the performance of the most able students, and raise the performance of the least able.  
We show that this result is also likely due to selection bias. 
We also demonstrate that various approaches to improve on the methodology used previously 
are not more successful.  Most studies on this question compare students attending 
comprehensive and selective schools.  Since many LEAs were in the middle of 
comprehensive reorganization in the 1970s, these schools often coexisted within the same 
LEA.  A better use of the policy variation, possibly removing some of the selection, is the 
comparison of LEAs which are either purely comprehensive or purely selective in 1969, 
when the NCDS cohort enters secondary school.  We show that this does not help in 
removing the selection bias.  Another approach is the use of instrumental variables (IV) for 
comprehensive reorganization (see, for example, Galinda-Rueda and Vignoles, 2004).  
Political control of the county is a good predictor of early reorganization, and conditional on 
county socio demographic characteristics is a plausible instrument.  We show that the IV 
strategy similarly fails. 
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At a theoretical level, there are good arguments for selection as well as for comprehensive 
education.  The main argument for selection or tracking is presumably that it is much easier 
to teach lower variance classes.  Since teachers can focus on the ability level of particular 
groups of students, students of all ability levels might benefit from selection.  One argument 
against selection is that there might be positive peer effects from the most able students.  By 
tracking these students into separate classrooms, the most able students may benefit from 
being with each other.  However, the lower ability ranges loose from not having this peer 
group around.  We know very little about the different impact of peer group effects on 
different types of students empirically, so it is difficult to judge a priori whether this leads to 
lower or higher average performance in a selective system.   
Another argument, particularly against early selection as in post-war Britain, is that eventual 
ability levels are difficult to predict at an age as early as 10 or 11.  Moreover, secondary 
selection is based on a single exam, clearly a noisy mechanism.  This may result in some kids 
ending up in the wrong track.  This suggests that particularly middle ability kids may loose in 
the British style selective system.  Since there are arguments going either way, the issue 
eventually is an empirical one. 
The findings in the empirical literature about selection differ widely.  Many researchers 
looking at the British secondary reorganization conclude that the evidence does not support 
claims to the superiority of either system (see, for example, Crook, Power, and Whitty, 1999).  
On the other hand, there are also studies which find more pronounced effects going one way 
or the other.  Jesson (2000) uses data from the 1990s on those LEAs which still remain 
selective.  Also using a value added approach, he argues that comprehensive LEAs 
systematically outperform selective LEAs in Britain. Based on the findings from the NCDS, 
these results are equally suspect.  We conclude that little can be learned from the existing 
literature on the British reorganization on the performance of comprehensive versus selective 
schools. 
Two recent papers by Hansushek and Wößmann (2006) and Waldinger (2006) apply an 
approach roughly similar to ours to educational inequality across countries.  Both papers 
investigate whether inequality in educational outcomes is related to the amount of secondary 
school tracking and selection across countries.  These papers apply a differences-in-
differences approach comparing outcomes between secondary and primary schooling.  
Hanushek and Wößmann find evidence that tracking raises educational inequality, while 
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Waldinger does not.  However, Waldinger shows that the Hanushek and Wößmann results 
are not very robust to alternative sample and variable specifications.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section briefly describes the 
institutional background of British secondary education, and the history of comprehensive 
reorganization.  Section 3 discusses the empirical framework, and the approaches used in 
some of the existing literature.  The following section describes the data and key variables.  
Results are discussed in section 5, and the final section concludes. 
 
2. Secondary Education in Britain1 
After World War II, secondary education was provided mainly in grammar and secondary 
modern schools.  The 11+ exam, taken at the age of 10 or 11, determined whether a student 
was allowed to attend the selective and academically oriented grammar school.  About 25 
percent of students would attend grammars, with the remainder attending less challenging 
secondary modern schools.  While this was the consensus model, education policy making in 
Britain was always rather decentralized, with the local educational authorities (LEAs) being 
the main administrative units, which retained a lot of decision making power about the exact 
make-up of the local school system.  The 1944 Education Act only prescribed separate 
secondary schools and a transfer at age 11 leaving open the possibility for LEAs to 
experiment with other schemes, including comprehensive schools.  Early drives for the 
establishment of comprehensives at the local level were typically, although not exclusively, 
in Labour dominated urban areas, like London, Bristol, and Coventry. 
The existing consensus about secondary schooling at the national level also began to crack in 
the 1950s.  There was growing unease about the selection process using the 11+ examination, 
which determined the admission to grammar schools.  Moreover, it became obvious that there 
were other alternatives to a selective system than large comprehensive schools serving all 
children age 11 to 18 at once.  The Leicestershire LEA, for example, began to experiment 
with abandoning the 11+ and creating a comprehensive school up to age 14.   
By the early 1960s, many, if not most, LEAs were working on reorganization plans, which 
were trying to end the traditional selective system, or were challenging it in one way or 
another.  While Labour led LEAs played a leading role in this development, the trend cut 
                                                 
1 This section draws heavily on the descriptions in Kerkhoff et al. (1996) and Griffith (1971). 
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across party lines, with some Conservative authorities being among the most fervent 
advocates to ending selection.  As a response, the 1964 Education Act passed by the 
Conservative government abandoned the principle of school transfer at age 11. 
Only in 1963 had the Labour Party fully embraced the comprehensive principle at the 
national level and called for the end of selection at their party conference.  When Labour 
came to power in 1964, its goal was to accelerate the existing trend for comprehensive 
reorganization, which was well underway at the local level.  However, there was a great 
diversity of views on how this reorganization should be achieved.  Rather than compelling 
LEAs on a particular system of comprehensive schooling, the government issued Circular 
10/65 in July 1965, requesting local authorities to submit detailed plans on how to establish 
comprehensives.  The circular itself suggested no fewer than six different models of 
comprehensive reorganization.  The middle school model, pioneered in Leicestershire, often 
turned out to be popular with Conservatives, because it allowed them to retain the grammar 
schools as the upper schools (an example is the Leeds LEA).  Nevertheless, in practice, most 
comprehensive schools eventually became 11 – 16 or 11 – 18 schools.   
By the mid-1960s, secondary education in England and Wales was rather diverse.  In some 
LEAs, comprehensive reorganization had been well under way for years.  The majority were 
drawing up plans to respond to the central government’s request in some way or another.  A 
small number of LEAs resisted the call by the central government completely.  This diversity 
was not limited to the LEAs but often extended to divisions and districts within the LEAs.  
Overall, the period from 1965 to 1974 was one where new comprehensive schools were 
established in most parts of the country, and the fraction of students served by these schools 
increased dramatically.  In 1965, there were still only 262 comprehensive schools in England 
and Wales.  By 1974 this number had grown to 2,677, and these were attended by 62 percent 
of secondary students in LEA maintained schools (see Figure 1). 
One of the key issues of contention during this period was less the establishment of 
comprehensive schools, as the closing of existing grammar schools, some of which had a 
long tradition.  As a result, new comprehensive schools often coexisted with the traditional 
grammar schools in many places, hence perpetuating selection despite reorganization.  There 
was also great variety in the form the new comprehensive schools took.  Some were purpose 
built, others were amalgamated out of existing schools, often on different physical sites.  
Some served pupils until they reached the university entrance exams at age 18 (A-levels), 
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while others ended at 16 and students who wanted to stay in school longer were served by 
separate so called sixth form colleges.   
The pace of reorganization was very different in different places as well.  When the 
Conservatives won the national elections in 1970, Education Secretary Margaret Thatcher 
effectively rescinded circular 10/65.  But this change in national policy was unable to stem 
the existing tide, and, in fact, more comprehensives were opened under Mrs. Thatcher’s helm 
at the Education Department than under any of her predecessors or successors.  Nevertheless, 
while the change in the government did not reverse the longer-term trend, the comprehensive 
movement never regained the same thrust it had during the 1960s.  Comprehensive 
reorganization, while concentrated in the 1960s and 70s, does continue into the 1990s (see 
Figure 1).  A few LEAs still maintain grammar schools, and the political discussion about the 
merits of selection continue in Britain until this day. 
This investigation, like many previous ones, focuses on England and Wales, which went 
through the protracted transformation process just described.  Scotland transformed to a 
comprehensive system more quickly, and without much local discretion.  Nevertheless, 
Scotland is not particularly useful as a comparison group because it has a very different 
educational system from England and Wales with its own school leaving exams and 
university system (undergraduate degrees taking 4 years compared to 3 in England).  
Northern Ireland kept the selective system during this period but it is not included in the 
NCDS, and also differs sufficiently from the rest of the UK to make a comparison difficult. 
 
3. Methodological Considerations and Comparison with the Previous Literature 
The goal of the investigation is to determine how a student or set of students who were 
educated in a comprehensive school would have fared, had they been part of the selective 
system instead.  Beyond the impact of the secondary system on the average outcomes on 
students, we might be interested in the distributional aspects of the policy change: for 
example, do high ability or low ability students benefit more from one system or the other.  
The main challenge in the evaluation of these questions is that participation in comprehensive 
schooling may be correlated with the ability or family background of the student. 
Suppose that outcomes for a student at age 16 are given by the following linear relationship 
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iiiiii SFACy 16161616161616 ελδγβα +++++=  (1)
where y16i is the test score at age 16, Ci is an indicator for a student attending a 
comprehensive school, and Ai, Fi and Si, are the student’s ability, family background, and 
primary school inputs, respectively.   The coefficient β16 measures the impact of 
comprehensive schooling on student achievement and is the parameter of interest.  γ16, δ16, 
and λ16 are the loadings on ability, family background, and primary school inputs for age 16 
achievement.  These effects may be different from the loadings for outcomes at other ages.  
ε16 is a random term, due to the fact that test scores measure actual student achievement only 
with error, to account for differences in secondary school inputs other than comprehensive 
schooling etc.  A similar relationship to (1) holds for student achievement at age 11: 
iiiii SFAy 111111111111 ελδγα ++++=  (2)
and Ci does not enter in this case.   
The key challenge in estimating the relationship in (1) is that complete information 
particularly on ability but possibly also on the relevant family background and school input 
variables is not available.  In order to overcome this data deficiency, researchers have turned 
to “value added models.”  Instead of trying to estimate (1) directly, these models estimate  
iiii yCy 161116 ηρβα +++=  (3)
In order to compare (3) to the earlier equations (1) and (2), multiply (2) by ρ and subtract it 
from both sides of (1).  This yields: 
iiiiiiioi SFAyCy 1116111611161116111616 )()()( ρεερλλρδδργγρβα −+−+−+−+++=  (4)
It is obvious from (4) that the value added model implies the restriction γ16 = ργ11 and 
analogous ones for the other parameters (see Todd and Wolpin, 2003, for a more detailed 
discussion of the restrictions inherent in the value added model).  These are stringent 
restrictions: they say, for example, that the effect of ability has a reduced impact on student 
achievement at age 16 compared to age 11 (assuming that ρ < 1), and this reduction is the 
same as the reduction in the impact of primary school inputs.   
One way to address this problem is to let the lagged test score proxy ability (which is 
typically most difficult to observe), and to include additional controls for family background 
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and primary school inputs in (3), so that the augmented value added model now takes the 
form: 
iiiiii SFyCy 161116 ηλδρβα ′++++′+′=  (5)
This is a model which is frequently estimated in the literature, e.g. it is the specification 
adopted by Kerkhoff et al. (1996).   
If the restrictions leading to the value added specification (3) are true, then the coefficients δ 
and λ in (5) should be zero.  Estimating (5) and testing this restriction is therefore effectively 
a test of the narrower value added model (suggested, for example, by Todd and Wolpin, 
2003).  Maybe more importantly, even if δ and λ are non-zero in (5), if the estimates of β 
from (3) and β’ from (5) are very similar, this is an indicator that the remaining family 
background factors and primary school inputs are largely orthogonal to the comprehensive 
school assignment, conditional on the lagged test score.  This would generally raise the 
researcher’s confidence that other potentially omitted factors are also orthogonal to the 
comprehensive school treatment.  We will therefore look at this implication in our data 
below. 
Looking at (4) makes clear that measurement error in age 11 test scores will be part of the 
error term of that equation.  If Ci is correlated with true age 11 achievement, then 
measurement in the test scores will invariably bias the estimate of β, the coefficient of 
interest.  We will be able to explore this issue because multiple test scores are available on 
the NCDS.  Hence it is possible to instrument one test score with an alternative score.   
Return to student achievement at age 11 as described in equation (2).  If we want to estimate 
this equation, we face the same problem that particularly ability is not available.  However, 
the NCDS also contains age 7 test scores so that we can estimate: 
iii yy 11711 ηρα ′′+′′+′′=  (6)
or possibly (6) augmented by family background factors and pre-primary inputs.  Notice from 
the discussion above that the value added model essentially implies a stationary student 
achievement process.  If equation (3) is valid for age 16 achievement, then equation (6) ought 
to be valid for age 11 achievement.  Moreover, the coefficients ρ and ρ” ought to be the same 
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(except for the fact that there is only a four year gap between 7 and 11, while there is a five 
year gap between 11 and 16).   
Most important for our investigation, including the indicator Ci in (6) serves as a specification 
test.  To the degree that the secondary school environment does not affect outcomes at age 
11, it should have a zero coefficient if (6) is correctly specified.  If comprehensive schooling 
matters for age 11 test scores, then this implies that equation (6) is misspecified.  Given the 
close analogies between equations (6) and (3), this most likely implies that (3) or (5) are 
misspecified as well. 
The studies by Kerkhoff et al. (1996) and Galinda-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) both focus on 
comparing students attending comprehensive schools with students attending selective 
schools.   However, as we argued above, comprehensive and selective schools coexisted in 
the majority of LEAs at the time the NCDS cohort entered secondary schools.  The bulk of 
the identification will therefore come from these mixed LEAs.  But if grammar schools 
coexist alongside comprehensive schools in the LEA it is unclear whether the comprehensive 
schools will really have an intake which is representative of all students or whether the 
grammar schools will keep cream skimming the best students.  The comprehensive schools 
would effectively just be relabeled secondary modern schools in this case.  This approach 
also makes no direct use of the policy variation introduced by the British transition to 
comprehensive education.2 
As an alternative, we also compare students in LEAs which are purely selective with those in 
LEAs which are purely comprehensive in 1969.  This approach is not without problems 
either, because LEAs which switched to the comprehensive system early enough for the 1969 
entering cohort tend to be systematically poorer and have lower ability students.  
Nevertheless, there are two advantages to this approach.  The first is that only these pure 
LEAs truly compare a comprehensive and a selective regime.  Comprehensive schools in 
mixed LEAs may have a very different composition because of the cream skimming effect.  
The second advantage is that the control strategy in equations (3) or (5) is more believable 
when only the between LEA variation is being used.  Whether a student attended, say, a 
comprehensive or a grammar school within an LEA is a question of individual school choice.  
The controls therefore need to reflect all the factors relevant to that individual choice. While 
                                                 
2 Kerkhoff et al. (1996) acknowledge this problem, and also compare only LEAs which are either purely 
selective or purely comprehensive.  However, they downplay this approach because it results in relatively small 
sample sizes.   
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this is a tall order, across LEAs we only need to control for the fact that the average 
characteristics of students in comprehensive and selective LEAs differ.  Measurement error 
and omitted variables are therefore likely to be of much less consequence. 
A different approach is to estimate versions of equations (3) or (5) by instrumental variables.  
Galinda-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) present estimates where they use political control in the 
county as an instrument for comprehensive school attendance.  The discussion above 
suggested that this might be a valid instrument, conditional on county socio-demographic 
characteristics.  The validity of the IV approach can similarly be checked by estimating the 
age 11 model.  Since the instrument is an LEA level variable, we implement this approach 
only in the LEA level analysis. 
 
4. Data and Variables 
Our main data source is the National Child Development Study (NCDS).  The survey 
includes everyone born between March 3 and 9, 1958.  After a parental survey at birth, there 
were follow-ups at ages 7, 11, 16, 23, 33, and 41.  The original survey included 17,414 births.  
However, the study has had significant attrition, and by the time of the fifth wave at age 33, 
information is only available for 11,407 sample members.  Extensive information on the life 
course of each individual is available, including interviews with the sample member, parents, 
teachers, health professionals, and results on aptitude and medical tests, as well as on official 
school leaving exams (O-levels and A-levels).  Our sample includes all individuals in 
England and Wales, on whom there is information from the schools in the age 7, 11, and 16 
surveys.   
We make no attempt to replicate the exact results in any specific previous study.  Sample and 
variable definitions are therefore idiosyncratic to this analysis.  A variety of achievement tests 
were given to the NCDS sample members at ages 7, 11, and 16.  Each test is scored on its 
own scale.  In order to make results easier to read, we have converted all test scores to a 0 – 
100 scale.  The key outcome measure we analyze is the math test score at age 16.  The same 
reading test was given to the sample members at ages 11 and 16, and the test was not really 
appropriate at age 16.  As a consequence, we concentrate on the math test results at 16.  A 
variety of other outcomes would be available (like O-level and A-level participation and 
results, post-secondary schooling, etc.).  However, test score outcomes have featured 
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prominently in the previous literature.  They also most easily allow the comparison with age 
11 outcomes. 
In order to classify LEAs as either comprehensive or selective, we relied on data on school 
attendance by LEA from Education Statistics for the years 1967, 1971, and 1974, and on 
descriptions of secondary reorganization plans in Comprehensive Schools Committee (1967) 
and Benn (1971).  The NCDS distinguishes 164 LEAs in 1969.  According to our 
classification there are 26 comprehensive and 29 selective LEAs with observations in the 
sample, while 109 LEAs are not used.  A list is given in appendix table 3. 
We supplemented the NCDS data with some area characteristics from the 1971 Census, 
which we merged with the 1969 residential LEA of the sample member.  In addition, we 
collected data for the political composition of the county or county borough, which we use as 
instrumental variables.  Local political control in Britain is organized in a number of counties.  
Some cities are administered independently of the counties (these are called county 
boroughs).  The LEAs outside Greater London in 1969 coincided either with a county or 
county borough.  We collected information on the outcomes of local elections in 1961 from 
the newspaper The Times and supplemented it with information from the Municipal 
Yearbook (1962).  The Times typically also reported which party held control of the county 
council, which is the variable we use.  Where this information is missing, and one party held 
the majority of the seats, we assigned control to that party.  There are a few counties and 
county boroughs, which were established between 1961 and 1969.  In these cases, we used 
political control in the main predecessor area in 1961. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Table 1 shows regressions of the math test score at age 16 on a dummy variable whether the 
student attends a comprehensive school.  Different specifications add different sets of control 
variables, which are described in Appendix table 1.  Column (1) shows the raw difference 
between comprehensive school students and those attending selective schools, either 
grammars or secondary moderns.  Comprehensive students score 7.7 points lower on average.  
This is about a third of the student level standard deviation of the math score, which is 22.4, 
so that the raw difference is not insubstantial. 
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Of course, the raw difference probably reflects mostly the fact that comprehensive schools in 
the sample had a different intake than selective schools.  Hence, column (2) presents a value 
added specification like equation (3) by adding the math test score at age 11, when students 
entered secondary school.  The comprehensive coefficient now changes to -2.2, only about a 
third the original difference.  Nevertheless, this specification still indicates that 
comprehensive school students score worse than students in selective schools.   
The remaining columns in the table probe whether this estimate might reflect the causal effect 
of comprehensive education using the standard technique of adding additional covariates.  In 
column (3), we add four other age 11 test scores (a reading, verbal, non-verbal, and a design 
copy score).  Adding these additional scores changes the result relatively little to about -2.1.  
Column (4) introduces demographic and family background variables, making this an 
augmented value added specification as in equation (5).  The set of background variables is 
roughly similar to the ones used in Kerkhoff et al. (1996) (we use dummies for gender, more 
than two siblings, twins, no mother figure, no father figure, and four dummies for father’s 
occupation).  The estimate in column (4) changes relatively little compared to column (3).  
Finally, using almost 50 covariates about the family, primary school experience, and county 
characteristics in the last column yields a coefficient of -1.5.3  While this is closer to zero, it 
is still not very different from the estimate in column (2).   
The test of the narrow value added specification suggested by Todd and Wolpin (2003) 
amounts to an F-test on the background variables in columns (4) and (5).  The F-statistics are 
27.9 and 11.9 respectively.  Both are highly significant with p-values well below the 0.1 
percent level.  This means that the narrow value added specification is clearly rejected.  On 
the other hand, the comprehensive school coefficient changes little as these covariates are 
added, suggesting that the background variables are more or less uncorrelated with the 
student attending a comprehensive school, conditional on the lagged test scores.  Hence, it 
seems unlikely that other variables could be found which would change the estimate if added 
to the last specification.  This would suggest that a coefficient in the order -2.0 or -1.5 
actually reflects the causal effect of the comprehensive experience.  An effect of this size, 
about 0.07 to 0.09 standard deviations of the math test score, is not huge but could well be of 
a plausible magnitude for a policy like comprehensive schooling. 
                                                 
3 This results in a smaller sample because of missing values in some of the covariates.  The change in the 
comprehensive coefficient from column (4) to (5) is entirely due to the additional covariates, not the change in 
the sample. 
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Table 2 probes this conclusion by repeating the same exercise, but using the math test score 
at 11 as the dependent variable, and test scores at age 7 as the controls.  The raw difference 
between selective and comprehensive school students in age 11 math scores in column (1) is 
8.4, about the same magnitude as for the age 16 scores.  Adding the age 7 math score lowers 
the difference only to 6.0.  This may be due to the fact that the age 7 math score is not as 
good a predictor of age 11 performance, as the age 11 score is of age 16 performance.  It is 
indeed the case that the raw correlation of age 16 and age 11 scores is much higher than that 
of age 11 and age 7 scores, 0.77 compared to 0.56.  This may not be surprising, since children 
are just learning basic arithmetic at age 7, so the age 7 score is a more noisy measure of 
actual ability to do math at 11.   
Hence, it is not surprising that adding additional test scores for reading and drawing in 
column (3) makes more of a difference.  The coefficient is -4.9 now.  Similarly, the 
comprehensive-selective difference falls to 4.0 when the Kerkhoff et al. (1996) type 
background variables are added, and to 3.3 when a large set of about 40 background controls 
are added.  The covariates are also highly significant again.  These results probably all reflect 
that age 11 performance is more difficult to predict than performance at age 16.  If we were 
to look at results like those in table 2, and wanted to draw a causal inference, we would be 
much more cautious because the results are more sensitive to the set of included controls.   
But more importantly, the results in table 2 suggest that the value added specification, 
controlling for lagged test scores and background characteristics, is not a panacea in this 
context.  If the strategy worked well in purging the regressions of any selection, we would 
expect the comprehensive school coefficient to be zero, at least in column (5).  However, this 
coefficient is actually twice as large in absolute value as the corresponding coefficient in 
table 1.  If this result is likely to reflect selection bias, then we should be equally worried 
about the results in table 1. 
There are various possibilities why we might expect a negative effect in table 2.  One is that 
attending a comprehensive school in the future actually affected students during their primary 
school experience.  Primary schools in selective areas would spend much time preparing 
children for the 11+ examination.  Hence, it might not be surprising that students who 
eventually went to selective schools did much better on an age 11 exam than those going on 
to comprehensive schools.  While there is certainly some truth to this explanation, we doubt 
that it can provide much comfort.  It is unlikely that the primary school experience has twice 
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as large an impact on student achievement than actually attending a comprehensive school, 
although it is of course possible.   
Secondly, many of the comprehensive school students in this sample actually attended mixed 
LEAs.  In many of those LEAs it might not have been clear during the primary years whether 
the child would eventually attend a selective or comprehensive school.  Hence, 
comprehensive school students might have obtained the same exam preparation during their 
primary years.  In order to examine this issue, we start from the specification in column (4) 
and limit the sample to LEAs that were neither clearly comprehensive nor clearly selective.  
Depending on how stringent this selection is done, we obtain coefficients between -4.4 and 
-3.8, very similar to the coefficient in column (4).  This may still not be the best comparison, 
because rural counties might have been mixed, but this reflects mostly differences between 
districts rather than mixing in the local areas.  Hence, a better test is to limit the sample also 
to urban areas, where comprehensive and selective schools most likely coexisted in mixed 
areas.  The range of coefficients is now -4.4 to -1.6, with the latter number referring to the 
most stringent sample selection.  Unfortunately, the sample sizes for this exercise are also 
small, and the standard errors also reach a size of 1.5.  But even the most conservative 
estimate of -1.6 is still of the same magnitude as those in table 1.4  So there is little reason to 
believe that the table 1 estimates do not simply reflect selection bias. 
A further possibility for the larger differences found for comprehensive students in table 2 is 
the larger degree of measurement error in age 7 test scores.  Since the lagged math test score 
seems to be the most important control variable, and adding other test scores has only a minor 
impact, we return to the specification with only the lagged math test score (but we now add 
the small set of background covariates).  On the other hand, contemporaneous test scores are 
rather highly correlated (for example, the age 11 math test score has a raw correlation of 0.74 
with the age 11 reading test score).  Hence, we instrument the math test score either with the 
reading test score, or with all the other available test scores.   
Results from this exercise are shown in table 3.  Columns (1) and (4) show the OLS 
estimates.  Columns (2) and (5) show the IV estimates, instrumenting the lagged math test 
score by the lagged reading test score.  The coefficient on the lagged test score increases in 
each case but by a much larger amount in case of the regressions for the age 11 scores.  In 
fact, the IV coefficient on the lagged test score is above 1 in column (5).  At the same time, 
                                                 
4 These results are robust to the type of adjustment we make for measurement error in table 3 below. 
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the coefficient on comprehensive schools drops in absolute value by about a third.  This 
indicates that measurement error in the lagged scores might indeed be a problem, and this 
accounts for some of the estimated negative effects of the comprehensive experience.  But 
again, this does not eliminate the negative estimates for the age 11 scores.  Similar results are 
obtained in columns (3) and (6) using all the other lagged scores as instruments.  
These results indicate that measurement error in lagged test scores is indeed important, and 
that it likely leads to bias in the coefficients of interest.  Nevertheless, measurement error also 
is not the explanation to the puzzle, since we still find strongly negative effects for age 11 
scores.  This means that selection remains a plausible and maybe even likely explanation for 
these findings, and hence sheds doubt on the age 16 results as well. 
So far, we have only investigated the average effects of the comprehensive school 
experience.  Much interest in the literature (e.g. Kerkhoff et al., 1996 and Galindo-Rueda and 
Vignoles, 2004) has focused on the distributional effects, however.  Table 4 turns our 
attention to this issue.  Like in Kerkhoff et al. (1996), we introduce an interaction between 
attending a comprehensive school and lagged ability.  We summarize ability in this case by 
the average of the math, reading, verbal, and non-verbal test scores at age 11, and by the 
average of the math, reading, and drawing score at age 7.  The ability measures are also on a 
scale of 0 – 100.   
Like the previous authors, we find a strong interaction effect in column (1) for the age 16 
results.  While the main effect of attending a comprehensive school is positive, the interaction 
is negative.  A hypothetical student at the 10th percentile of ability (with a score of 24.6) 
would score about 1 point higher in math at age 16 after attending comprehensive school.  
Contrast this with a student at the 90th ability percentile (scoring 75.8), who would score 
about 4 points lower after attending a comprehensive school.  This result suggested to the 
previous authors that comprehensive schools are good for weaker students while selective 
schools are good for the better students.  This is plausible, since the best students would be 
attending grammar schools in the selective system.   
This conclusion is again tempered by the results in column (2), where we repeat the exercise 
with age 11 math scores.  The basic result is the same, but the point estimates suggest an even 
steeper ability gradient.  Hence, the ability interaction may also simply be due to selection 
effects.  It suggests that comprehensives may have a more compressed intake in terms of 
abilities than selective schools.  This could be because different types of schools attract 
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different types of students, or because the areas switching to comprehensive schools earlier 
were more homogeneous. 
Of course, using covariates to fully control for the selection in what type of secondary school 
a student attends is a tall order.  So it may not be so surprising that this exercise fails.  A more 
promising approach is to only use the variation at the LEA level by comparing LEAs which 
were solidly comprehensive or solidly selective for the NCDS students.  This exploits the 
policy variation of the British experience more directly.  Furthermore, controlling for 
differences in student characteristics at the LEA level should be much easier than at the 
student level.  Hence, we repeat the same type of results for our subsample of LEAs, which 
we classified into one of these two categories.   
Table 5 displays the results.  The raw difference between students in comprehensive and 
selective LEAs is 5.8 points.  This is smaller than the raw difference between all 
comprehensive and selective students.  Nevertheless, it is large compared to the variation in 
test scores between LEAs, which is 9.1 using all LEAs.  Adding control variables in column 
(2) again lowers the coefficient to about -1.5, very similar to the finding in table 1 based on 
comprehensive school attendance.  Furthermore, the interactions with lagged ability in 
column (3) also suggest similar distribution effects as in table 4, but these effects are now 
somewhat smaller in magnitude.  Not surprisingly, the results are also less precise in this 
much smaller sample.  Are the LEA level results likely more reliable?  The results for the 
math score at age 11 suggest the opposite.  These results are also very close to those in tables 
2 and 4.  Hence, this strategy is not really any more convincing than the previous one either. 
Finally, we follow the suggestion in Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) and use political 
composition of the county as an instrument for comprehensive status.  Our instrument, 
conservative control of the county or borough in 1961, predicts comprehensive status very 
well.  The t-statistic on the instrument in the first stage corresponding to column (1) in table 6 
is 32.4.  The IV estimate of the comprehensive effect is -2.6, slightly more negative than the 
OLS estimate in column (2) of table 5.  We also repeat the specifications interacting ability 
with comprehensive status in column (2).  In this case, we use the interaction of ability and 
conservative control as an instrument for the interaction term.  Again, the results are roughly 
similar to the OLS results.  Moreover, columns (3) and (4) show that we also obtain 
comparable results for the age 11 test scores yet again.  The instrumental variables strategy 
also does not seem to be able to remove the selection bias successfully. 
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6. Conclusion 
We have argued in this paper that the experience in England and Wales provides potentially a 
useful experiment to study the impact of comprehensive versus selective schooling.  Much of 
the research on this issue has adopted popular value added specifications for test score 
outcomes of affected and unaffected students.  We have argued that a useful specification test 
for these types of models is to apply them to students during their primary school years by 
using age 11 test scores at the dependent variable, and controlling for age 7 test scores.  As 
long as students do not fare differently in primary school, depending on whether they end up 
in a comprehensive or a selective school in the secondary system, these regressions should 
show a zero comprehensive effect if all selection is successfully controlled. 
Our results indicate the opposite.  Throughout the analysis, we have found rather similar 
patterns of results for the age 16 test scores and for the age 11 test scores.  We conclude from 
this that it is prudent to be cautious about interpreting the age 16 results causally.  As long as 
the age 11 results reflect selection bias, this may also be the case for the age 16 results.   
Of course, it is possible to argue that our age 11 results are biased, while the age 16 
specifications have removed all selection effects successfully.  There are various arguments 
to make this case, like the fact that age 7 controls are poorer predictors of age 11 outcomes, 
the fact that primary school teaching may differ depending on whether the students are going 
to take the 11+ exam, etc.  We have tried to show that none of these are likely to fully explain 
the age 11 results.   
Nevertheless we agree that it is a possibility that the age 16 results are right and the age 11 
results are wrong.  However, identification always requires a leap of faith.  We are typically 
willing to make this leap of faith when a research design seem particularly plausible (as in an 
experiment) or when we have prior knowledge or additional evidence that a particular 
identification strategy is likely to remove the selection bias successfully.  In this case, we 
have presented evidence to the contrary: that there is a good case to be made that selection 
bias exists in the estimates comparing students in comprehensive and selective schools.  Our 
case does not have to be ironclad to make us worried about the interpretations in the previous 
literature.   
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Our worry also extends to studies which do not use the NCDS.  Similar value added 
specifications have been applied to other data in order to answer this question (for example 
Jesson, 2000 using more recent data).  While we have not explicitly demonstrated potential 
problems with these estimates, we would remain cautious in drawing strong conclusions from 
a research design that essentially mirrors that adopted by the studies analyzing the NCDS 
data.  We conclude that we probably do not know very much about the effect of 
comprehensive schooling in Britain, or elsewhere for that matter.
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Table 1 
Math Test Scores at 16 
OLS Regressions 
 
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Attends Comprehensive School -7.74 (0.54) 
-2.18 
(0.35) 
-2.07 
(0.34) 
-1.80 
(0.34) 
-1.48 
(0.37) 
Control Variables:      
Math Test Score at 11 no yes yes yes yes 
Other Test Scores at 11 no no yes yes yes 
Kerkhoff et al. type background controls no no no yes yes 
Large set of background controls no no no no yes 
Number of observations 6734 6734 6734 6734 5747 
 
Note: Control variables are described in Appendix table 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Math Test Scores at 11 
OLS Regressions 
 
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Attends Comprehensive School -8.39 (0.62) 
-6.01 
(0.52) 
-4.91 
(0.46) 
-3.96 
(0.45) 
-3.29 
(0.45) 
Control Variables:      
Math Test Score at 7 no yes yes yes yes 
Other Test Scores at 7 no no yes yes yes 
Kerkhoff et al. type background controls no no no yes yes 
Large set of background controls no no no no yes 
Number of observations 6734 6734 6734 6734 6223 
 
Note: Control variables are described in Appendix table 2 
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Table 3 
Math Test Scores 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Math Test Score at 16 Math Test Score at 11 
Estimation Method OLS IV IV OLS IV IV 
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Attends Comprehensive 
School 
-1.88 
(0.35) 
-1.24 
(0.36) 
-1.28 
(0.36) 
-4.59 
(0.50) 
-2.90 
(0.62) 
-2.91 
(0.62) 
Math Test Score at 11 0.63 (0.01) 
0.73 
(0.01) 
0.73 
(0.01) --- --- --- 
Math Test Score at 7 --- --- --- 0.54 (0.01) 
1.14 
(0.03) 
1.14 
(0.02) 
Instruments:       
Reading Test Score at 11 no yes yes no no no 
Other Test Scores at 11 no no yes no no no 
Reading Test Score at 7 no no no no yes yes 
Other Test Scores at 7 no no no no no yes 
 
Note: Endogenous regressor is the math test score at 11.  Control variables are the Kerkhoff et al. type 
background controls, see appendix tables.  Number of observations is 6734. 
 
 
Table 4 
Math Test Scores 
OLS Regressions 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Math Score at 16 
Math Score 
at 11 
Regressor (1) (2) 
Attends Comprehensive School 3.49 (0.96) 
5.66 
(1.75) 
Comprehensive School * Ability at 11 -0.10 (0.02) --- 
Comprehensive School * Ability at 7 --- -0.17 (0.03) 
 
Note: Control variables are the Kerkhoff et al. type background controls, see appendix tables, and all 
test scores.  Number of observations is 6734. 
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Table 5 
Math Test Scores 
OLS Regressions 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Math Score at 16  Math Score at 11 
Regressor (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Comprehensive LEA -5.79 (1.48) 
-1.45 
(1.02) 
1.63 
(2.64) 
 -6.44 
(1.89) 
-4.68 
(1.39) 
4.60 
(3.16) 
Comprehensive LEA * Ability at 11 --- --- -0.06 (0.05) 
 
--- --- --- 
Comprehensive LEA * Ability at 7 --- --- --- 
 
--- --- -0.16 (0.06) 
Control Variables no yes yes  no yes yes 
 
Note: Control variables are the Kerkhoff et al. type background controls, see appendix tables, and all 
test scores.  Number of observations is 1487.  Standard errors are clustered by LEA. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Math Test Scores 
IV Regressions 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Math Score at 16  Math Score at 11 
Regressor (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Comprehensive LEA -2.57 (1.52) 
2.67 
(4.35) 
 -6.16 
(2.13) 
4.60 
(3.16) 
Comprehensive LEA * Ability at 11 --- -0.10 (0.08) 
 
--- --- 
Comprehensive LEA * Ability at 7 --- --- 
 
--- -0.12 (0.09) 
 
Note: Endogenous regressor is comprehensive LEA.  Instruments are a dummy for conservative 
control in 1961 for columns (1) and (3), and the dummy plus an interaction with ability at 11 in 
column (2), and the dummy plus an interaction with ability at 7 in column (4).  Control variables are 
the Kerkhoff et al. type background controls, see appendix tables, and all test scores.  Number of 
observations is 1487.  Standard errors are clustered by LEA. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Age 16 Regressions 
 
 
Variable Number of Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Math Test Score at 16 6734 42.4 22.4 
Attends Comprehensive School 6734 0.547 --- 
Control Variables 
Math Test Score at 11 6734 44.0 25.8 
Other Test Scores 
Reading Test Score at 11 6734 47.4 17.8 
Verbal Test Score at 11 6734 57.7 23.0 
Nonverbal Test Score at 11 6734 54.4 18.4 
Design Copy Score at 11 6734 70.3 11.4 
Kerkhoff et al. type background controls 
Female 6734 0.491 --- 
Two or more siblings 6734 0.608 --- 
Twin 6734 0.026 --- 
No mother figure at 11 6734 0.005 --- 
No father figure at 11 6734 0.034 --- 
Father’s occupation at 11: professional 6734 0.055 --- 
Father’s occupation at 11: intermediate 6734 0.184 --- 
Father’s occupation at 11: skilled 6734 0.519 --- 
Father’s occupation at 11: semi-skilled 6734 0.161 --- 
continued 
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Appendix Table 1 (continued) 
Summary Statistics for Age 16 Regressions 
 
 
Variable Number of Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Large set of background controls 
No father figure at 7 5747 0.020 --- 
Wales 5747 0.070 --- 
Borough council  5747 0.353 --- 
Father unemployed at 11 5747 0.026 --- 
Mother works at 11 5747 0.629 --- 
Free meal at school at 11 5747 0.077 --- 
Family had financial trouble last 12 months at 11 5747 0.091 --- 
Accommodation rented from council at 11 5747 0.382 --- 
Child doesn’t share bedroom at 11 5747 0.471 --- 
Accommodation as bath at 11 5747 0.951 --- 
Accommodation has indoor lavatory at 11 5747 0.899 --- 
Has moved 2 or more times since birth at 11 5747 0.355 --- 
Parents expect child to leave school at min. SLA 5747 0.045 --- 
Child goes to public library often at 11 5747 0.256 --- 
Child had contact with criminal justice system betw. age 7 and 11 5747 0.015 --- 
Missed school for 1 week to 1 month at 11 5747 0.317 --- 
Missed school for more than 1 month at 11 5747 0.048 --- 
Mom had health problems between age 7 and 11 5747 0.034 --- 
Child plans to get job after school 5747 0.196 --- 
Child plans to go to university after school 5747 0.290 --- 
Watches TV most of the day at 11 5747 0.848 --- 
Child attends private school at 11 5747 0.033 --- 
Child attends special needs school at 11 5747 0.005 --- 
School size at 11 5747 323.0 139.7 
Class size at 11 5747 34.8 7.2 
Attended two or more schools by 11 5747 0.454 --- 
Age group tracked at 11, higher ability track 5747 0.157 --- 
Age group tracked at 11, intermediate ability track 5747 0.111 --- 
Age group tracked at 11, lower ability track 5747 0.091 --- 
Teacher rating of general ability at 11 (score 1-5) 5747 3.06 0.84 
Teacher rating of math ability at 11 (score 1-5) 5747 2.97 0.92 
Teacher rating of use of books at 11 (score 1-5) 5747 3.20 0.85 
Teacher rating of oral ability at 11 (score 1-5) 5747 3.11 0.75 
County level proportion hhs in council housing, 1971 5747 0.291 0.090 
County level proportion employment manufacturing, 1971 5747 0.355 0.099 
County level proportion single parents, 1971 5747 0.089 0.026 
County level proportion men who are economically active, 1971 5747 0.607 0.018 
County level proportion men born in UK, 1971 5747 0.940 0.052 
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Appendix Table 2 
Summary Statistics for Age 11 Regressions 
 
 
Variable Number of Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Math Test Score at 11 6734 44.0 25.8 
Attends Comprehensive School 6734 0.547 --- 
Control Variables 
Math Test Score at 7 6734 52.9 24.5 
Other Test Scores 
Reading Test Score at 7 6734 79.4 22.5 
Drawing Test Score at 7 6734 41.4 11.7 
Kerkhoff et al. type background controls 
Female 6734 0.491 --- 
Two or more siblings 6734 0.608 --- 
Twin 6734 0.026 --- 
No father figure at 7 6734 0.021 --- 
Father’s occupation at 7: professional 6734 0.053 --- 
Father’s occupation at 7: intermediate 6734 0.149 --- 
Father’s occupation at 7: skilled 6734 0.545 --- 
Father’s occupation at 7: semi-skilled 6734 0.163 --- 
continued 
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Appendix Table 2 (continued) 
Summary Statistics for Age 11 Regressions 
 
 
Variable Number of Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Large set of background controls 
Wales 6223 0.071 --- 
Borough council  6223 0.345 --- 
Mother worked before child started school 6223 0.443 --- 
Accommodation rented from council at 7 6223 0.376 --- 
Accommodation as bath at 7 6223 0.891 --- 
Accommodation has indoor lavatory at 7 6223 0.840 --- 
Parents read to child hardly ever at 7 6223 0.108 --- 
Child talked at age 2 6223 0.943 --- 
Age child started school 6223 4.66 --- 
Attends private school at 7 6223 0.029 --- 
Child attends special needs school at 7 6223 0.002 --- 
School size at 7 6223 246.7 121.5 
Class size at 7 6223 35.4 7.2 
30% or more of dads in child’s class in non-manual occupation 6223 0.238 --- 
Occupation of dads in child’s class missing 6223 0.230 --- 
Age started reading in school 6223 5.47 0.67 
Age started math in school 6223 5.57 0.63 
Gets help in school for mental backwardness, disability, or 
behavior problem 6223 0.047 --- 
Gets no help in school but needs help for problem 6223 0.095 --- 
Child settled at school within one month 6223 0.719 --- 
Age group tracked at 7, higher ability track 6223 0.041 --- 
Age group tracked at 7, intermediate ability track 6223 0.017 --- 
Age group tracked at 7, lower ability track 6223 0.020 --- 
Teacher rating of oral expression at 7 (score 1-5) 6223 3.18 0.94 
Teacher rating of awareness of world at 7  (score 1-5) 6223 3.00 0.83 
Teacher rating of reading ability at 7 (score 1-5) 6223 3.16 0.90 
Teacher rating of creativity at 7 (score 1-5) 6223 2.93 0.82 
Teacher rating of reading ability at 7 (score 1-5) 6223 2.91 0.85 
County level proportion hhs in council housing, 1971 6223 0.291 0.090 
County level proportion employment manufacturing, 1971 6223 0.355 0.099 
County level proportion single parents, 1971 6223 0.089 0.026 
County level proportion men who are economically active, 1971 6223 0.607 0.018 
County level proportion men born in UK, 1971 6223 0.940 0.052 
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Appendix Table 3 
Treatment and Control LEAs 
 
 
Selective LEAs Comprehensive LEAs 
Barrow in Furness Anglesey 
Blackpool Blackburn 
Bolton Cardiff 
Bournemouth Carlisle 
Brighton Darlington 
Buckinghamshire Flintshire 
Burton upon Trent Gateshead 
Canterbury Isle of Wight 
Cheshire Leicestershire 
Dewsbury Luton 
Dudley Merioneth 
Eastbourne Montgomeryshire 
Great Yarmouth Newcastle upon Tyne 
Halifax Newport 
Hastings Norwich 
Ipswich Oldham 
Leicester Oxfordshire 
Norfolk Preston 
Portsmouth Rochdale 
Solihull Rotherham 
South Shields Sheffield 
Southend on Sea Stoke on Trent 
Southport Swansea 
Torbay Tynemouth 
Warley Wallasey 
Warrington West Bromwich 
Warwickshire  
Worcester  
York  
 
 
 
